The Economics of Parallel Trade – Iconoclast Views on a Dogma of EU Competition Law by Petit, Nicolas
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1661884
Work in progress – Comments welcome  
Please do not cite or quote without prior approval of the author 
 1
THE ECONOMICS OF PARALLEL TRADE  
–  
ICONOCLAST VIEWS ON A DOGMA OF EU COMPETITION LAW 
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Introduction 
 
Under European Union (“EU”) competition law, firms’ concerted or unilateral attempts to 
block parallel trade from “low price countries” to “high price countries” are akin to 
“hardcore” restrictions of competition infringing Articles 101 and 102 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union (“TFEU”). This is because parallel trade is deemed to 
improve consumer welfare, through downward price equalization. 
 
In the past decades, the Court of Justice (“CJ”) has repeatedly upheld European Commission 
(“the Commission”) decisions against firms that had sought to limit parallel trade within the 
EU. The leading cases involve sectors where goods and services are subject to price 
differentials across countries and/or IP rights, such as pharmaceuticals, cars, luxury goods and 
branded products, etc. In GlaxoSmithKline, for instance, the Court of Justice held that an 
agreement intended to limit parallel trade must in principle be considered to have as its object 
the restriction of competition.1 In Sot. Lélos kai Sia, it explained clearly that “parallel trade is 
liable to exert pressure on prices and, consequently, to create financial benefits” for 
consumers.2 Finally, in sectors involving Intellectual Property Rights (“IPR”), the Court have 
repeatedly judged that once a particular product/service is sold into a low price country, the 
IPR holder can no longer prevent imports of this particular product/service into the high price 
country. His rights are exhausted.3  
 
This strong prohibition of restrictions to parallel trade is firmly anchored in EU competition 
law. To date, most – if not all – attempts to soothe this principle have failed,4 or been left 
unanswered by the EU institutions.5 
 
From a public policy perspective, legal standards ought ideally to be based on robust 
economic evidence. Against this background, this paper seeks to demonstrate that whilst 
parallel trade (also referred to as “grey market trade” in the United States, or as “arbitrage” in 
economic theory) in the EU is subject to a remarkably sympathetic and protective legal 
regime, the economic case supporting this approach remains to be made. To this end, it shows 
that the position of the EU Courts, and more generally of the EU institutions, is far from 
unquestionable, in light of the relevant economic literature. First, there is no undisputed 
theoretical or empirical evidence that parallel trade improves short-term consumer welfare (I). 
Second, parallel trade may harm long-term consumer welfare, through a detrimental effect on 
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commercial and technological innovation (II). Third, parallel trade promotes speculation and 
other wasteful economic activities (III). Third, parallel trade may generate a host of collateral 
welfare-reducing effects on society at large (IV).  
 
 
 
I. Parallel Trade does not improve the Short-Term Welfare of Consumers absent 
any Substantial Effect on Price and Competition 
 
Proponents of parallel trade often intuitively argue that it leads to downward price 
equalization,6 and increased intra-brand competition (competition between perfect substitutes, 
i.e. products/services of a same brand) to the benefit of consumers (Abbott, 2007). Upon 
closer examination, this view is disingenuous at best. The short-term benefits of parallel trade 
on consumer welfare are indeed poorly documented in the empirical economic literature (1.1). 
Rather, from an economic standpoint, parallel trade may generally harm short-term consumer 
welfare, in preventing suppliers from engaging into socially efficient price differentiation 
(1.2). More specifically, parallel trade may also decrease the satisfaction of positional goods 
consumers (1.3). 
 
1.1 The Short-Term Welfare Effects of Parallel Trade on Consumers have not been 
Empirically Proven 
 
To date, the very few empirical economic studies devoted to the effects of parallel trade on 
consumer welfare have reached inconsistent results. To focus only on the EU internal 
situation – where parallel trade is lawful –7 a first strand of studies have invalidated the 
perception that parallel trade enhances consumer welfare in the short-term through price 
reductions. In 1999, a survey conducted in relation to a wide range of trademarked products 
(e.g., compact disks, cars, cosmetics and perfumes, soft drinks, clothing, etc.) reported for 
instance that the “effect of [parallel trade] on retailers and consumers was largely seen as 
neutral”, and consequently that the case for parallel trade is “simply stated and rests on the 
assumption that this will deliver lower prices to consumers” (NERA, 1998, pp.17 and 8 
respectively).  
 
In the same vein, a 2004 London School of Economics (“LSE”) study empirically tested the 
effects of parallel imports on six pharmaceutical product categories in six EU Member 
States.8 It found that “the hypothesis that pharmaceutical parallel trade stimulates price 
competition and drives prices down in destination (importing) countries over the long-term is 
rejected. There is also very little evidence lending support to the argument that parallel trade 
stimulates (price) competition among exporting and importing countries. Thus, the arbitrage 
hypothesis of price equalisation or price approximation is also rejected” (LSE, 2004, p.13).  
 
A similar finding was reached in a 2003 study, which demonstrated that parallel imports of 
pharmaceutical products in Finland had not intensified price competition, and has thus only 
generated nominal savings (Linnosmaa, Karhunen and Vohlonen 2003). 
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A second strand of empirical studies has, however, pointed out to a contrary conclusion. In 
2001, a study showed that the price of drugs subject to parallel imports in Sweden had risen 
less than the price of other drugs (Glandsandt and Maskus 2001). Similarly, a 2003 study 
focusing on patented drugs in Denmark, the United Kingdom (“UK”), Germany, Sweden and 
the Netherlands found that prices had decreased with competition from parallel trade between 
1997 and 2002  (West and Mahon, 2003). In the same vein, another study covering 50 
pharmaceutical products in Denmark, Germany, the UK and Sweden found in 2006 that 
parallel imports competition had exercised a downward effect on prices (Pedersen, Enemark 
and Sorensen, 2006).  
 
Finally, a third strand of studies offers nuanced, ambiguous results. For instance in 1999, a 
report of the Swedish Competition Authority indicated that the magnitude of the price 
increases arising from a prohibition of parallel imports was at best limited (Swedish 
Competition Authority, 1999). To add even more confusion to this complex state of affairs, an 
academic paper published in 2003 argued that the price pressure exerted by parallel imports 
was highly product specific and often immaterial (Persson, Anell and Persson, 2001). 
 
Overall, the empirical economic literature hardly provides any conclusive evidence that 
parallel trade delivers lower prices to consumers. In addition, most of the abovementioned 
studies relate to pharmaceutical products, subject to patents. One may thus wonder whether 
their findings apply across the board, to other industries and other forms of IPR. Finally, from 
a purely methodological standpoint, the robustness of those empirical studies is not entirely 
convincing because they either: (i) are based on unverifiable proprietary information; (ii) rely 
on unreliable stakeholders surveys (Glansandt and Maskus, 2007); or (iii) have been financed 
by industry stakeholders.9 
 
1.2 Parallel Trade injures Short-Term Consumer Welfare by removing the Ability of 
Producers to engage into Socially Efficient Price Differentiation 
 
In addition to the lack of clear-cut empirical evidence in support for parallel trade, economic 
theory puts another dent in the blanket intuition that parallel trade improves short-term 
consumer welfare. Many economists consider that parallel trade is indeed detrimental to 
consumer welfare because it prevents firms from charging different prices in countries where 
consumers have different preferences (Malueg and Schwartz, 1994).  
 
The core of this idea revolves around the fact that in real world markets, consumers often 
exhibit a different ability or willingness to pay. This may be due to differences in wealth, 
taste, investment in “branding”, taxes, cultural differences, local purchasing power, insurance 
system, etc. (NERA, 1999; Swedish Competition Authority, 1999). For instance, a bottle of 
Polish-branded vodka might be perceived as a special product in Western Europe – hence 
western EU consumers are ready to pay a high price for this product – and by contrast, be 
perceived as a relatively standard product in Poland – hence Polish consumers are only 
willing to pay a low price for this product. In a setting of this kind, the vodka producer will 
charge different prices in Poland and in the western European countries, according to the 
consumers’ ability to pay (economists talk of consumer elasticity) (Heimler, 2008).  
 
From an economic perspective, there is “nothing intrinsically bad” about such forms of “price 
discrimination” (NERA 1999). On the contrary – as long as production costs are covered – 
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differential pricing entitles firms to serve markets where consumers’ ability to pay is limited. 
Those consumers would likely not be served if producers had to set a uniform EU-wide price 
(Ganslandt and Maskus, 2007, p.21). Price differentiation thus allows producers to make 
some consumers better off (those of the low price country), without making other consumers 
worse off (those of the high price country). As long as consumption increases, price 
differentiation is thus a “Pareto-efficient”, welfare enhancing practice (Pigou, 1920; 
Robinson, 1933; LSE 2004, p.41; Heimler, 2008). In addition, in industries where fixed costs 
are high (e.g., in R&D or advertisement-intensive sectors), any increase in the quantities 
produced (and sold) generates economies of scale. Hence, price differentiation also improves 
the welfare of producers (see, for a similar argument, Hilke, 1988; NERA, 1999, p.6). 
 
By contrast, in a legal system which forbids all restrictions of parallel trade, a producer can no 
longer price discriminate, absent means to close off parallel imports from low price to high 
price countries. If parallel trade undermines his profitability in the high price market,10 the 
producer may choose to sell at a single price across all markets, possibly leaving some 
markets unserved (Szymanski and Valletti, 2005, p.2). The producer holder may even decide 
to shut down distribution activities in low price markets (Grossman and Lai, 2008, fn 4). This, 
in turn, is likely to trigger a spate of other harmful economic side-effects (e.g., job losses, 
etc.), particularly if the low price country is a developing economy (Kenny and McNutt, 
1999). In summary, parallel trade is likely to discourage manufacturers from selling to 
countries where prices are very low. 
 
From a public policy standpoint, the upshot of the above analysis is that rules forbidding price 
differentiation (such as the above-mentioned case law or the so-called principle of 
international exhaustion) yield welfare-reducing effects on consumers (LSE 2004, p.41). Such 
rules are indeed likely to lead to increased, uniform prices or alternatively to reduced 
products/services availability in low price countries (Gallini and Hollis, 1999). Conversely, 
from a welfare-oriented perspective, rules maintaining some wiggle room for producers to 
price discriminate are socially beneficial to consumers. This is all the more true when 
consumers across markets exhibit heterogeneous characteristics (Malueg and Schwartz 1994, 
p.22). To date, only a few, solitary studies have challenged the view that price discrimination 
is socially efficient (Abbott 2007, pp.5-7; Raff and Schmitt, 2007). 
 
1.3. Parallel Trade may reduce the Satisfaction of Customers on Specific Product Markets 
 
Parallel imports may reduce the satisfaction which consumers derive from certain 
products/services (often, trademarked products/services) in the case of positional goods (or 
“Veblen goods”), such as luxury cars, high-end wines, etc. In a system of unfettered parallel 
trade, the influx of low-price imports (i) will decrease in the short-term the personal 
satisfaction of consumers located in the high price country (Kenny and McNutt, 1999); and 
(ii) might in the long-term dry out demand for the product/service, which will no longer be 
perceived as an exclusive or high status good 
 
 
II. Parallel Trade harms the Long-Term Welfare of Consumers, through a 
Detrimental Effect on Commercial and Technological Innovation 
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Parallel trade also wields harmful effects on long-term consumer welfare, in chilling 
producers and retailers incentives to innovate. To start, it is a reasonable assumption that 
producers take the future profitability of their purported products/services into account when 
devising their R&D or advertising programmes. Hence, the very fact that parallel imports may 
depress ex post profit margins, will reduce producers’ ex ante incentives invest (Li and 
Maskus, 2006) in costly R&D, advertising campaigns or product-quality improvement 
programmes (Valletti and Szymanski, 2006).11  
 
Interestingly, in GlaxoSmithkline, the EU General Court (“GC”) seemed, albeit implicitly, 
open to the view that restrictions on parallel trade could stimulate R&D financing.12 This case 
concerned a distribution agreement between a pharmaceutical firm and its wholesalers which, 
in essence, sought to limit parallel trade from Spain to high-price countries. In a 2001 
decision, the Commission had refused to admit that the agreement contributed to R&D 
funding, and denied the benefit of the exception rule enshrined in Article 101(3) TFEU. On 
appeal, the Court vacated the Commission’s decision. It considered in particular that the 
Commission had not sufficiently examined whether the agreement gave rise to an “economic 
advantage” by contributing to the financing of pharmaceutical innovation. 
 
Likewise, parallel trade may undermine retailers incentives to invest (Yonathan, 2008) into 
before-sale (e.g., marketing, promotional advertisement, product information, websites), sale 
(e.g., testing, advice, etc.) and after-sale (e.g., technical assistance, service workshops, etc.) 
services. On close examination, the chilling effect of parallel trade on retailers ex ante 
incentives to invest is twofold. First, the fact that retailers’ investments will help parallel 
traders capture sales without incurring similar costs (and procure the goods at a lower price) is 
perceived by the latter as “free-riding” on their investments (Telser, 1960; Perry and Porter, 
1986; Chard and Mellor, 1989; LSE, 2004).  
 
Second, in a regime of unfettered parallel trade, the influx of low price imports may induce 
official dealers to focus on price reductions and neglect service (Yonathan, 2008, p.66). Of 
course, this is likely to introduce a jolt of intra-brand competition in the market. Meanwhile, 
however, this may reduce inter-brand competition, which crucially hinges on the ability of 
market players to promote their brands through efficient retail services.  
 
Unfortunately – and despite their immediate impact on consumers – retailers’ investments are 
often overlooked because unlike producers’ costly R&D and advertisement programmes, they 
do not involve substantial numbers. 
 
 
III. Parallel Trade incentivizes Speculation and other Wasteful Economic Activities 
at the Expense of Society 
 
3.1 Parallel Trade as a Driver for Speculation 
 
Like most, if not all, economic operators, parallel traders are profit-maximizers. Yet, unlike a 
majority of economic operators, parallel traders must make little, if any, investments in the 
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course of their business.13 They simply hedge against transport, transactions and regulatory 
costs, as well as exchange rates differentials.14 In plain language, parallel traders are 
speculators. They buy and sell products with the sole purpose of taking advantage of market 
price differentials. Their business model is devoid of any value-adding, innovative activity. 
 
With this in mind, it becomes obvious that parallel traders have every incentive to keep their 
purchasing price secret from their clients (LSE, 2004, p.88);15 charge high prices; and pocket-
in the widest possible profit margin when exporting products/services. Parallel traders’ ability 
to speculate is magnified when end-consumers are not price sensitive, such as when their 
purchases are refunded by national healthcare systems (for instance, through social security 
schemes) (LSE, 2004).  
 
Against this background, and provided that the existence of parallel trade does not improve 
the welfare of end-consumers,16 the question whether a system of unrestrained parallel trade is 
desirable revolves around what economists term a “distributional” (or transfer) issue. Indeed, 
a system of parallel trade is tantamount to a tax on investments. Put simply, governments 
should decide whether they want (i) to give preference to producers that have incurred 
investments (and their official retailers) by affording them a degree of protection against 
parallel imports; or; (ii) to confiscate part of their revenue, and distribute it to parallel 
traders.17  
 
The resolution of this issue involves a discretionary policy choice. This being said, any such 
decision ought to be based on a comparative assessment of the contribution that parallel 
traders and producers respectively bring to economic welfare. In this regard, the very fact that 
long-term innovation strategies and investments are critical to economic growth should steer 
public policy choices towards increased protection of inventive firms. By contrast, 
governments should resist the temptation to assist opportunistic operators, who speculate on 
short-term imbalances between markets, and free-ride on others’ investments.  
 
3.2 Parallel Trade encourages Inefficient and Wasteful Economic Behaviour 
 
Some proponents of parallel trade have argued that besides improvements to short-term 
consumer welfare, parallel trade also yields additional welfare-enhancing effects. In the 
normal course of their business, parallel traders must indeed proceed to repackaging, 
relabeling, marketing and other handling activities (Swedish Competition Authority, 1999, 
p.28). Arguably, those activities give rise to job opportunities, and should thus be encouraged. 
Moreover, parallel trade would arguably allow retailers subject to cyclical demand 
vacillations on their home market (fluctuations in fashion, for instance), to offload inventory 
on other markets, thereby encouraging timely rationalization measures (Swedish Competition 
Authority, 1999, p.30). 
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One close examination, those allegations deserve to be mitigated. The first argument is an 
economic misnomer. Economic theory considers that welfare is maximized when as little of 
society’s scarce resources (capital and labour) are consumed to produce a given good/service. 
This means that the ratio between input and output is optimized. When a parallel trader 
engages into repackaging, relabeling, marketing, and handling activities, he consumes 
additional scarce society resources, without however, increasing output. This business activity 
is thus socially inefficient. 
 
The second argument is equally misconceived. Virtually all business management textbooks 
teach that efficient operators anticipate demand fluctuations, and accordingly adjust their 
procurement needs. Rules entitling firms to freely offload quantities on external markets fare 
poorly with this principle. They are likely to trigger input overconsumption dynamics (thereby 
misallocating scarce resources within society). Anticipating that there will be external markets 
on which they can sell whenever they want, retailers will be induced to order large quantities.  
 
 
IV. Parallel Trade generates a Host of Adverse Collateral Effects 
 
6.1 Parallel Trade generates Welfare-Reducing Effects on Other Products/Services 
 
A first harmful collateral effect of parallel trade may arise when the supplier is active on 
several markets, where he provides a range of complementary products/services (e.g., a car 
manufacturer that provides also credit and financial services to customers). Faced with 
parallel imports with respect to one product/service but not to others, the supplier holder may 
seek to recoup the profits lost on the product subject to parallel imports through price 
increases on the other product/service. This is clearly detrimental to the short-term consumer 
welfare in the market for the product not subject to parallel-imports. Alternatively, the 
supplier may decide to cut down on investments in other products/services (Swedish 
Competition Authority, p.21), thereby again harming the “interests of consumers” in terms of 
quality and choice (NERA, 1999, p.6). For instance, the car manufacturer will decide to cease 
providing credit and financial services.  
 
6.2 Parallel Trade exacerbates the Costs of Fighting Against Counterfeiting and Piracy 
 
Parallel trade facilitates counterfeiting. An OECD report noted that in the area of sportswear, 
“it is not uncommon for parallel traders to send genuine samples to the importer and mix the 
consignment with counterfeits” (OECD, 1998, p.13). Because parallel imported product 
consignments sometimes conceal pure counterfeits, it is critical that suppliers holding IPR can 
avail themselves of border controls and import suspension measures against parallel imported 
products/services. Such protections are generally absent from countries endorsing a full 
parallel trade regime. This is why it is generally considered that “allowing parallel imports 
would weaken a number of defences against counterfeiting and piracy” (NERA, 1999, pp.7 
and 14).  
 
Besides this, economic literature suggests that in industries subject to counterfeiting, an 
optimal response for suppliers holding IPR is to keep their product distinct from (potential) 
counterfeiters. The maintenance of distinctiveness is seen as a “prerequisite” for effective 
anti-counterfeiting strategies (Bosworth and Yang, 2006). To this end, IPR holders must 
invest significant resources into branding and other market promotional activities. However, 
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the fact that parallel trade reduces the profitability of IPR holders limits the resources that can 
be devoted to the fight against counterfeiting. 
 
6.3 Parallel Trade encourages Manufacturers to engage into Socially Wasteful Behaviour 
 
A system of unlimited parallel trade is likely to prompt suppliers to adopt a range of private 
remedies in order to curtail parallel trade. From an economic perspective, such remedies are 
socially wasteful because they consume resources which could otherwise be allocated to 
productive and innovative investments. Illustrations of such practices include: re-labelling on 
export markets, change of the product specifications in export markets; adoption of different 
trademarks in each country to discourage gray trade; modification of product/service 
characteristics across countries (Hilke, 1988, p.6). 
 
6.4 Parallel Trade discourages Efficient Distribution Systems 
 
Systems of parallel trade limit the dissemination of products/services throughout society. A 
certain degree of protection against parallel imports might be necessary to increase the density 
of a distribution network (and in turn, foster intra-brand service competition). A prospective 
distributor contemplating the decision to join a distribution network will typically request 
assurances from the supplier that he will not be confronted with cut-throat price competition 
from parallel importers. Absent such assurances, he might be reluctant to join the distribution 
network in the first place. A similar argument applies to technology transfer agreements and 
the dissemination of information (Fink, 2005; Conley, 2008). 
 
6.5 Parallel Trade conflicts with Other Global Policy Goals (Sustainable and Economic 
Development) 
 
6.5.1 Parallel Trade is Incongruent with Sustainable Development 
 
In recent years, many of the world’s nations have repeatedly insisted on promoting economic 
strategies which “meet the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future 
generations to meet their own needs” (United Nations World Commission on Environment 
and Development, 1987). Worldwide, this commitment has led governments to incentivize – 
and sometimes coerce – economic operators to optimize energy generation and consumption 
patterns.  
 
A salient, often overlooked feature of parallel imports is to trade-off the long-term 
preservation of natural resources against short-term economic benefits in the form of intra-
brand competition. This is because parallel trade duplicates transport flows, for instance 
through “reimports”. In addition, parallel trade may lead suppliers to relocate their production 
facilities towards low-costs, energy-inefficient countries. This, in and of itself, is wholly 
inconsistent with the current fervor for sustainable development and the use of eco-friendly 
production techniques (Swedish Competition Authority, p.40). 
 
6.5.2 Parallel Trade is Incongruent with Economic Development 
 
From the standpoint of low price, developing countries, “it is unclear whether parallel trading 
brings net benefits to the economy” (World Bank, 2000, p.36). To draw a glaring – yet 
controversial – analogy, in the parallel trading ecosystem, developing countries are akin to 
large shopping malls, where massive quantities of products/services can be sourced under 
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attractive conditions. As a result, an increasing number of parallel traders source 
products/services from developing countries, and one cannot exclude that the needs of the 
local populations will not be fully ensured. Albeit not a developing country, it has been 
reported that Greece – a low price country which has positioned itself as a primary source of 
parallel trade in the EU – has experienced shortages in pharmaceutical products (LSE 2004, 
p.85). 
 
A second reason evincing the adverse effects of parallel trade on economic development lies 
in the fact that suppliers are unable to price discriminate across nations. As a result, many 
manufacturers simply refuse to operate in countries where prices are low (Kenny and McNutt, 
1999, p.11). Some observers have, however, contended that this issue was not a cause of 
concern. They argue that in a system of parallel trade, welfare is “additive”.18 The gains of 
consumers located in the import country would allegedly be greater than the losses for 
consumers located in the export country, because the former value the product/service more. 
Hence, from a welfare-oriented standpoint, parallel trade would be beneficial, regardless of 
the fact that consumers in the low price country are no longer served. 
 
It is submitted that this argument is wholly unpersuasive, and contrary to basic principles of 
economics and natural justice. Under standard economic theory, a welfare optimizing 
outcome arises when all the customers that are ready to pay the producer’s costs are served. In 
the above setting, consumers in the export country are not served, regardless of their ability to 
pay a price which compensates the producer’s costs. Economic welfare might thus not be 
maximized. A more optimal outcome could, however, be attained with international price 
discrimination. The producer would set its price above costs, but would serve consumers in 
the export and the import countries at different prices (LSE, 2004, p.32).  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Legal standards often have a profound impact on economic growth. They should thus be 
based on sound economics, and in particular on an objective assessment of the costs and 
benefits of alternative legal principles.  
 
In light of the above, the EU institutions’ firm stance in favour of unbridled parallel trade does 
not seem really founded from an economic standpoint. Beyond the intuitive view that parallel 
trade stimulates intra-brand competition to the benefit of consumers, the opinion that most 
economists hew to is that parallel trade may wield welfare-reducing effects. The current legal 
paradigm has thus more to do with politics – the commitment to market integration inherited 
from the late 1950s – and/or legal conservatism – the Court’s reluctance to recast entrenched 
legal standards – than with sound economics.   
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